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I. Background of the research 
I.1. The effects of foreign direct investments 
 At the end of the 20th century the international flow of capital 
accelerated significantly, with the volume of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
the role and importance of this type of capital also grew in the host 
economies. Foreign direct investments may have varying effects on the 
income-producing ability of the given economy, on its market relations and on 
the standard of living depending on the characteristics of the host economy, of 
its markets and the nature of the political-economic regulation. They may 
ensure additional resources for the investments that promote the development 
of the host economy, expand the employment opportunities, and through 
operating capital investments the participants in the host economy – either 
directly or indirectly – may gain access to new markets or to modern 
technologies, enterprise management, organisation and marketing know-how. 
Simai [2000], however, calls attention to that “the interests of the host 
countries in improving the performance of their economies and the interest of 
international corporations […] are not necessarily one and the same. Szentes 
[1999] highlights that besides the advantages of foreign direct investments 
outlined previously, they may also carry with them potential disadvantages for 
the country receiving the foreign capital.  
 Navaretti and Venables [2004] highlight competition, changes to 
factor demand and factor price, and technology spillover effects as main 
“channels”, mechanisms transmitting the effects of the foreign direct 
investments in the host economy. The effects arising through the above 
mentioned channels may be both positive and negative depending on the 
characteristics of the host economy and on the nature of capital invested and 
the motivation behind the investments.  
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 A significant proportion of the empirical research carried out 
examining the effects of FDI place the relationship between foreign presence 
and company productivity at the centre of their field of interest. All of the 
most recent results confirm the technology spillover effects both vertically 
(Markusen and Venables [1999], Lin and Saggi [2007], Halpern and 
Muraközy [2007], Blalock and Gertler [2008]), and horizontally (Javorcik 
[2004]) in the host economies, providing evidence of the existence of a 
channel mediating the potential positive effects of FDI. 
 The effects of FDI, however, may be mediated in parallel by several 
channels at the same time, so it may happen that the positive effects mediated 
through the one channel may be damaged by the negative effect realised 
through a different channel. It is necessary and desirable, therefore, to also 
examine the other channels as well as the effects of FDI realised through 
them. This study was written with the aim of identifying the effects realised 
through the changes to another channel mentioned by Navaretti-Venables 
[2004] that mediates the effects of FDI, factor prices – and within this the 
price of labour as production factor. 
I.2. FDI and earnings 
 It has been know of for a long time that foreign-owned companies 
pay higher wages to their employees. Dunning and Morgan [1980], after 
correcting for differences at the industry level, confirm the observation 
published in the 1973 annual report of the U.S. Tariff Commission, according 
to which the multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in the United States 
of America and Canada pay higher wages to their employees than the 
domestic enterprises. Aitken et al. [1996] show that foreign-owned companies 
pay higher salaries in Mexico and Venezuela than the domestically owned 
companies and that the rise in wage level spills over, Lipsey and Sjöholm 
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[2004] prove that in Indonesia the presence of foreign enterprises causes the 
aggregate level of wages to grow. The results of investigations1 performed in 
several different countries suggest that the foreign wage premium is a real 
phenomenon irrespective of the level of development of the countries in 
question. 
 It can be read frequently that foreign-owned companies are 
concentrated in more productive sectors with knowledge-intensive production, 
they use superior technology, and employ highly qualified and productive 
workers to a higher proportion than their domestically owned competitors. 
Therefore, research can come to misleading results if – while analyzing the 
wage premium – one does not control sufficiently for the differences that may 
be found in the sizes of companies, in sector characteristics and productivity 
and, over and above these, the differences in employee composition. The 
majority of research work examining wage differences in a foreign-domestic 
ownership specific context draw conclusions from enterprise-level 
observations, due to this during the analysis the possible effects on wage 
differences of company characteristics may be controlled sufficiently but the 
difference deriving from employee composition of the individual companies 
and variations in the individual characteristics of employees are, however, not. 
As the individual characteristics of employees has a great influence on their 
productivity and so on the development of their wages, investigations that 
leave these largely out of consideration and are bases solely on company-level 
data significantly overestimate the wage premium paid by foreign-owned 
companies (this is proved in the most illustrative way by the study carried out 
 
1 Doms and Jensen [1998], and Feliciano and Lipsey [1999] in the United States of America, 
Globerman, Ries and Vertinsky [1994] in Canada, Conyon et al. [2002] and Girma et al. [2001] in 
the United Kingdom, Görg et al. [2007] in Ghana, Te Velde and Morrisey [2001] in four other 
African countries, Huttunen [2007] in Finland, Almeida [2007] in Portugal, and Kertesi and Köllő 
[2001], Csengődi et al. [2008] and Earle and Telegdy [2008] In Hungary. 
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by Heyman et al. [2007], presenting that a positive and significant foreign 
wage premium based on company data controlled for individual 
characteristics becomes negative. 
 Linked employee-employer datasets are more suitable for the 
examination of ownership-specific wage differences. Hovewer, analyses 
performed on these type of data that allows controlling for characteristics of 
both employees and their employer more in detail, report much lower wage 
premiums than company-level studies and present mixed evidence. While 
Heyman et al. [2007] in Sweden show that foreign ownership results in lower 
wages and a lower rate of wage growth, Huttunen [2007] presents 2-4% wage 
premium in Finland, Almeida [2007] found a 2-4% foreign wage premium in 
Portugal, which, however, may only be observed in the manufacturing 
industry. Csengődi et al. [2008] report a 15-17% foreign wage premium 
among Hungarian manufacturing industry employees, Earle – Telegdy [2008] 
show a general foreign wage premium of 14% in Hungary. On the basis 
unpublished results (most of them working papers) MalchowMoller et al. 
[2006] in Denmark and Martins [2004] in Portugal do not find significant 
foreign premiums, contrary to this Pesola [2007] reports an actual foreign 
wage premium among well-educated workers in Finland.  
 The Swedish example of Heyman et al. [2006] calls attention to that 
it is also important to analyse the wage premium distribution among different 
types of employees, as in their article referred to above (Heyman et al. [2007]) 
the negative foreign wage premium related to the entire economy only occurs 
in the case of employees with a low level of education/low skilled employees, 
while employees with high qualifications/high skilled employees, and top 
managers realise an actual and significant wage premium. 
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I.3. The effects of FDI wages in the host economy 
In the different wage payment practice of foreign-owned companies we can 
identify a possible channel that mediates the effects exerted by FDI on the 
host economy. In order to find the effects and evaluate them it is necessary to 
perform a more thorough examination, analysis of wage premium, as several 
theoretical explanations exist for the phenomenon of the wage premium paid 
by foreign-owned companies, with varying standard-of-living implications. 
a.) the positive effects associated with evolution of the wage premium:  
 Structural change and adjustment: In unison with foreign ownership, 
new, more productive technology, better production procedures, 
organisational solutions appear, which for the employees of domestic-
owned companies ensure higher productivity for the same amount of 
investment (individual labour), and so ensure higher wages, in this way 
the labour force flows over to the foreign-owned enterprises offering 
higher wages. In this case the wage premium is temporary and partial, in 
other words it can only be observed during the flow over (adaptation) 
period and only in the sectors affected by foreign presence.  
 Training2: Foreign owned companies provide training for their 
employees to increase their productivity, which also increases the wages 
that they can earn, therefore the productivity and wages of those working 
at foreign enterprises grows as time progresses. Due to the time required 
for the training the wage premium develops only gradually and only for 
those who take part in the training courses, then stabilises on a level and 
remains there. 
 
2 The link between the training provided by foreign companies for their employees and the wage 
premium is presented convincingly by Görg et al. [2007]. 
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 Incentive wages3: Foreign-owned companies are more likely to use 
incentive schemes than domestically owned enterprises (for example 
efficiency wages designed to reduce the costs of employee supervision, or 
the wage premium designed to reduce the costs of replacing labour due to 
worker turnover and so providing an incentive for the workers against 
leaving their workplaces). In this case the wage premium can be observed 
right from the start of the operation of the foreign-owned company, it 
remains in a stable way over time and is more probable (although not 
necessarily true) among production workers than those working in lower 
positions. 
 Unions, and the reduction of workplace disputes4: In the case of 
foreign-owned companies it is more characteristic than in the case of 
domestic-owned companies for such trade unions to be formed that are 
capable of acquiring a part of the rent formed at the enterprise for the 
employees, and so providing higher wages for the employees. Foreign-
owned companies are more willing to “compensate” their employees in 
advance in order to avoid workplace disputes and strikes by the 
distribution of the company rent. In these cases the wage premium 
develops and grows gradually and is only probable in among production 
workers and employees in lower positions. 
 Cross-boarder rent-sharing5: Foreign-owned enterprises may be 
willing  to remunerate their employees on the basis of “global” 
 
3 In connection with the so-called efficiency wages theory see: Shapiro-Stiglitz [1994], and in 
connection with the incentive wages designed to reduce the costs of replacing lost labour force 
see: Enderwick [1985] 
4 In connection with the link between foreign companies and trade unions see: Driffield [1996], 
and in connection with the rent distribution taking place for the purpose of reducing workplace 
disputes see: Pugel [1980] 
5 For details see: Budd et al. [2005]  
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productivity and not on the basis of local labour market impulses. This is 
mainly characteristic and observable in the upper management of foreign-
owned companies, those working in economic and strategic decision-
making positions, high-ranking employees from the very start of the 
operation of the company. 
 b.) The negative effect of FDI may be suggested in the examined context: 
 Incentives against knowledge spillover6: Wage premium is expected to 
reduce the leakeage of superior knowledge to local competitors through 
worker-turnover. Mainly high-skilled and high-educated workers are 
expected to recognise the production advantage and to have the ability to 
transfer the production advantage providing technology and to domestic-
owned enterprises, therefore, it high-skilled, high educated workers 
should realise a wage premium that can be observed from the start of the 
operation of the company. (Naturally this practice improves the standard 
of living of those receiving the wage premium, but also the obstruction of 
the spreading of more developed technology may hinder the development 
of the host economy.) 
c.) The lack of FDI-effects are assumed when wage differences can be 
explained through unobserved heterogeneity of 
 the production technology influencing the productivity of the workers, or 
 the working conditions provided by the companies,  
 the the employees (more precisely their characteristics that influence their 
productivity and, through this, their wages). 
 
6 See: Forfuri et al. [2001], Glass-Saggi [2002], Markusen [2002] 
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II. Methods applied 
The aim of this dissertation is to perform a detailed analysis of the 
development (in time and among the various type of employee) of the wage 
premium paid by foreign-owned companies to identify the possible reasons 
for the payment of the wage premium and to point out the nature of its effect 
exerted on the FDI host economy through the channel mediating the effects of 
FDI, in other words the wage premium. 
II.1. Data 
 Our investigation used the basis of a ten-year panel dataset covering 
the period 1992-2001 containing the detailed characteristics7 of more than 
5000 Hungarian manufacturing industry companies (employing more than 20 
full-time employees) and their employees.  
II.2. Estimation methodology 
 In order to identify the causality between foreign ownership and the 
wage premium – similarly to other authors (Huttunen [2005], Almeida [2007], 
Heyman et al. [2007], Earle and Telegdy [2008]) – we take companies that 
have been acquired by foreigners as a basis, which had previously been in 
domestic ownership, we trace the development of the wages8 paid by them 
before and following the change of ownership, in comparison with the wages 
of employees with the same individual characteristics employed at 
domestically owned enterprises all the way through the period of observation. 
 
7 Individual characteristics observed: sex, school qualification, labour market experience, job and 
position. Observed company characteristics: sector (4-figure sector classification code, of which 
we use the first two figures for the analysis), premises location, company size (number of 
employees), significant financial data of the report and company tax return and the “production 
capital intensity” and “labour productivity” formed from these. 
8 Workers’ average monthly earnings made up in the following way: worker’s gross earnings for 
the month of May + bonuses for May + 1/12 part of the premium for the previous year 
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 We identify the wage premium paid by foreign-owned companies 
controlled for a wide range of individual and company characteristics in wage 
regressions, in which we isolate the effect of foreign ownership on individual 
wages and put it in numbers in % form. Besides the OLS estimation we 
controlled for company-fixed effects and occupation-fixed effects identifiable 
on 539 occupation group levels, in order to better filter out effects derived 
from unobserved heterogeneity of the companies and workers. 
 We traced the evaluation of wages for a period longer than in the 
cases of other research, we excluded the possibility of selection bias derived 
from the self-selection of acquired companies and making wage premium 
interpretation difficult. We analyse the effect exerted by foreign ownership on 
the wage premium broken down according to the school qualifications of the 
employees (maximum vocational training school, secondary school, diploma), 
and according to occupation (blue collar worker, white collar worker without 
strategic decision making competence, white collar worker with strategic 
decision making competence), then through the differences of the 
development of wage premium characteristic of the individual groups we 
determine the nature of the effects of FDI realised on the host economy 
through the wage premium.  
 To test the robustness of the results of the regression estimates run on 
the entire sample we repeated our estimates on an alternative reduced 
company control group and acquired company sample created with a nearest 
neighbour matching procedure. 
II.3. The questions to be examined 
1.) Can the foreign wage premium be identified? 
2.) Does the wage premium grow or drop in time or stays constant? 
3.) Is there a wage among all types of employees? 
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III. Results of the dissertation 
III.1. The wage premium exists 
 The variable indicating the ownership nature of the employer 
company (the value of which is 1, if the proportion of foreign ownership in 
the company’s subscribed share capital is above 50%, otherwise it is 0) is 
stated in the Mincerian wage regression, which explains the level of 
individual wages paid to the employees with company and individual 
characteristics. The regression coefficient of this variable – the value of which 
can be interpreted in % - indicates the effect of foreign ownership on 
individual wages. As a result of our estimation we identify a 15% foreign 
wage premium. 
 It may happen that companies in foreign ownership employ a higher 
proportion of people working in positions where the role of formal schooling 
is less significant, but the performance of the task still requires a high-level of 
individual skills, and in accordance with this it results in higher wages besides 
higher individual productivity. In the case that employees are concentrated in 
certain positions – related to ownership nature – the higher wages seem to be 
due to foreign ownership unless we properly control with respect to the 
differences that can be identified in the composition of the employees of the 
individual companies in the various positions. Therefore, controlled for 
occupation-fixed effects in connection with the occupation characteristics of 
the observed employees (539 HSCO9 category) the explanatory power of the 
estimation increases, however the 15% value of the wage premium does not 
change. 
 
9 HSCO – Hungarian Standard Classification of Occupation. The 4-digit occupation 
categorisation used by the Central Statistical Office. As the code system changed in 1993 our 
analysis can only be performed for the period between 1994-2001, if we control in detail for 
occupation, and for their fixed effects. 
 13 
 In the course of the fixed effects estimation performed in order to 
filter out the unobserved heterogeneity of the individual companies, the 
foreign ownership variable’s regression coefficient gains new meaning: the 
4% value obtained from the estimation indicates that in the case of the 
company changing ownership the employee earn 4% higher wages on average 
in the period when the company is in foreign ownership. 
 This result supports that when analysing the explanation of the wage 
premium it is worth concentrating on the causality between the change of 
ownership and the wages of the employees. For this reason in the following 
we shall concentrate on the time profile of the wages paid by companies 
registered in the database as companies in domestic possession and then 
bought up by foreign owners during the observed period (the proportion of 
foreign ownership within the company’s subscribed share capital increases 
above 50%). The wages are examined by comparing them to the wages paid 
by companies that are similar to the companies changing ownership in every 
respect but remaining in domestic ownership during the entire observed 
period, in the years before and after the change of ownership (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th and further years before/after the change of ownership), checking in detail 
both company and employee characteristics. 
III.2. Wage premium develops gradually 
 In order to examine the time profile of wage premium, instead of the 
majority foreign ownership variable, several dummy variables describing the 
ownership status of the company employing the given employee are generated 
in respect of the periods before and after the change of ownership (the value 
of which is 1, if the company is in foreign ownership in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th 
year before/after the change of ownership, otherwise it is 0), and in respect of 
the year in which the change of ownership takes place. When this group of 
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variables is applied to the simple and job and company fixed effects wage 
regressions, a clear picture is outlined (see: table 1). 
 
Table 1: Evolution of foreign wage premium with different specifications 
 
Dependent variable: 
log monthly gross earnings 
OLS 
 
(1) 
occupation 
fixed 
effects 
(2) 
firm  
fixed 
effects 
(3) 
-0.01 - 0.06* 4 or more years before ownership change 
(-0.30)  (1.90) 
-0.03 -0.02 -0.04 3 years before ownership change (A) 
(-0.73) (-0.56) (-1.00) 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.03 2 years before ownership change (B) 
(-.44) (-0.44) (-0.81) 
-0.02 -0.00 -0.02 1 year before ownership change (C) 
(-0.72) (-0.13) (0.62) 
0.12** 0.14* 0.11** year of ownership change (D) 
(2.17) (1.83) (2.11) 
0.05*** 0.06*** 0.04* 1 year after ownership change (E) 
(2.58) (2.71) (1.73) 
0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06** 2 years after ownership change 
(3.16) (3.12) (2.44) 
0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 3 years after ownership change 
(7.28) (3.47) (6.61) 
0.16** 0.17*** 0.15*** 4, or more year after ownership change (F) 
(10.43) (4.71) (9.67) 
0.05 0.17 1.79 Preprogram test: (A)=(B)=(C) 
 (0.98) (0.85) (0.15) 
4.50** 5.34** 3.76* Ho: (C)=(D) 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
6.99*** 15.18*** 3.65* Ho: (C)=(E) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) 
19.25*** 23.96*** 19.00*** Ho: (E)=(F) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R2 0.57 0.68 0.64 
Number of observations 343.450 343 450 275 397 
Notes: heteroskedasticity-consistent t values in paranthesis; ***, ** and * refer for significance at 
99%, 95% or 90% level; control variables: personal characteristics (education, experience, 
gender, occupation), firm-characteristics (capital intensity of production, average added value of 
the workforce), further controls: dummies for firm-size categories, regional characteristics, 2digit 
industry code, year of observation. 
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 Before the change of ownership companies bought up by foreign 
owners paid average wages to their employees, so the interpretation of the 
causal relation between wage premium and foreign ownership is not 
influenced by the self-selection of companies or employees (the pre-program 
test comparing the wages paid by companies facing acquisition with the 
wages paid by other companies in domestic ownership and permanently 
remaining in domestic ownership is insignificant in the case of all 
specifications). Wage premium appears after the change of ownership and it 
increases in time. 
 The results of the estimates made with 3 different specifications are 
consistent; the variable coefficients (also interpretable in percentage) 
indicating the periods following the change of ownership have very similar 
values. Foreign wage premium builds up gradually progressing in time after 
acquisition and the change of ownership. A 4-6% foreign wage premium 
appears already in the 1st year following the change of ownership – it is 
proved by the value of the test examining the significance of the difference 
between the wage premium observed in the year before (C) and in the year 
after (D) the change of ownership, that is the significance of the effect of the 
change of ownership on the wage premium, which value is stated in table 1. 
Our estimates indicated a 12-13% foreign wage premium in the 3rd year 
following acquisition, and 15-17% foreign wage premium in the 4th and 
further years following acquisition. The amounts of wage premium observed 
in the year following acquisition (D) and in the 4th and following years after 
acquisition (E) are significantly differently, the wage premium increases as 
time progresses. When making the estimates again on the company control 
group selected using the nearest neighbour matching procedure and on a 
reduced sample containing the data of the companies bought up and their 
employees, effects of a similar intensity are observed in respect of fixed 
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company effects, while in respect of fixed job effects it is found that the 
intensity of the effect reduces while the increasing tendency of the wage 
premium persists and the outstanding wage premium level observed in the 
year of acquisition reduces justifying the use of the matched sample. 
 The seemingly high wage premium indicated in the year of the 
change of ownership is only a temporary phenomenon, which is explained by 
the changes taking place at the company in he course of and due to the change 
of ownership. After the change of ownership unnecessary and insufficient 
labour force is discharged, as a result of which the average work efficiency 
(company efficiency per employee) of the remaining employees increases, 
which may also increase their wages, and periodical premium paid to the 
remaining employees is also likely. After the change of ownership new 
technologies, production procedures may be introduced, and a new type of 
work organisation is realised, as a result of which the productivity of the 
employees reduces temporarily – this reduction in productivity is followed by 
their wages –, and after the company’s production system has been set up and 
the employees have acquired the new production procedures, the company 
realises a rent due to higher productivity resulting from better technology and 
production procedures, and the company shares some of this rent with the 
employees. 
III.3. Only employees in lower positions realise wage a premium 
 The results of Heyman et al. [2006] show that apart from the 
confirmation of the existence of the wage premium phenomenon it is also 
necessary to examine the distribution of wage premium among groups of 
employees identifiable on the basis of different characteristics. So the original 
estimation functions are re-run on the subsamples created on the basis of the 
job characteristics and qualifications of the individual employees and the 
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results are evaluated. We re-run our estimates on subsamples created by 
splitting the full sample through the employees most important job 
characteristics (blue collars, white collars without strategic decision making 
competence, while collars with strategic decision making competence).  
 
Table 2: Results on the full sample, divided by broad occupation categories  
Dep. var Occupation fixed effects Firm fixed effects 
log gross 
earnings 
blue 
collar 
white 
collar, 
nonmana
-gerial.
white 
collar, 
mana-
gerial. 
blue 
collar 
white 
collar, 
nonamana
-gerial. 
white 
collar, 
mana-
gerial.. 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (6) 
-0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 before owner 
change (A) (-0.06) (-0.68) (0.25) (-0.67) (0.96) (-0.45) 
0.09** 0.15** 0.07 0.10** 0.22*** 0.15 year of owner 
change (B) (2.21) (2.19) (0.72) (2.10) (2.57) (0.14) 
0.04* 0.03 0.11 0.05** 0.11*** 0.12*1 year after 
(C) (1.66) (1.27) (1.41) (3.18) (6.45) (1.68) 
0.07*** 0.05 0.20** 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.20***2 years after 
(2.58) (1.48) (2.39) (3.26) (4.99) (2.78) 
0.11*** 0.13*** 0.20** 0.09*** 0.16*** 0.10 3 years after 
(6.50) (4.55) (2.49) (5.28) (6.49) (1.16) 
0.13*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.14* 4 or more 
years after (D) (8.72) (8.41) (4.58) (6.58) (9.77) (0.06) 
3.70* 4.00** 0.21 6.61** 5.25** 3.67*Ho: (A)=(B) 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.65) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
2.51 3.84* 0.95 13.19*** 8.78*** 4.87**Ho: (A)=(C) 
(0.11) (0.05) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
12.69*** 22.51*** 1.78 16.95*** 36.09*** 0.09 Ho: (C)=(D) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.77) 
R2 0.53 0.60 0.42 0.65 0.65 0.81 
observations 191 952 77 220 6 225 237 560 98 635 7 255 
 Notes: heteroskedasticity-consistent t values in paranthesis; ***, ** and * refer for significance at 
99%, 95% or 90% level; control variables: personal characteristics (education, experience, gender, 
occupation), firm-characteristics (capital intensity of production, average added value of the 
workforce), further controls: dummies for firm-size categories, regional characteristics, 2digit 
industry code, year of observation. 
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Controlled estimates relating both to fixed company and job effects indicate 
significant wage increase among blue-collar workers and white-collar workers 
without strategic decision making competence. Wage premium realised in the 
long term is 12% or 13% in the case of the former group of employees, while 
it is 19% or 24% in the case of the latter group, depending on which type of 
fixed effects are controlled. However, white-collar workers with strategic 
decision making competence do not realise wage premium either in the year 
following acquisition or in the long term (it is demonstrated by the 
insignificant result of the tests examining A=C and C=D hypotheses). When 
repeating the estimates on the 3 subsamples created by separating matched 
sample job characteristics, results consistent with the ones above are obtained: 
a significant wage increase is observed in the case of the two groups of 
employees in lower positions, while employees in managing positions do not 
realise a significant wage premium. 
 A similar result is obtained if the original estimates are repeated on 3 
subsamples created along the groups set up according to school qualifications 
(skilled workers, employees having secondary school qualifications, 
employees having a diploma). Although significant wage premium is 
observed on the entire sample in the long term in the case of all three groups, 
on the matched sample ensuring a more refined selection of the control group 
no significant effect can be observed among employees having a diploma, 
while foreign ownership guarantees higher wages and a steeper profile of 
wage evolution for employees with secondary school qualifications or lower 
school qualifications. 
III.4. Interpretation of empirical results 
 As a result of our study we prove the existence of foreign wage 
premium, identify a causal relation between foreign ownership nature and 
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wage premium. Earlier on, when examining the phenomenon of foreigners 
buying up companies in domestic ownership it was demonstrated that – after 
buying up domestic companies of average performance – foreign wage 
premium develops gradually in time following acquisition. Wage premium 
appears in the case of employees with lower school qualifications (with 
secondary school qualifications at the most) filling lower positions (blue 
collar worker, white collar worker without strategic decision making 
competence), while employees holding a degree or white collar workers with 
strategic decision making competence do not realise wage premium. 
 Consequently foreign wage premium is an existing channel through 
which the effect of FDI is asserted. A direct positive effect on welfare is 
identified, which is realised in the form of higher wages by employees with 
secondary school qualifications at the most, or blue collar workers and white-
collar workers without strategic decision making competence. 
 As wage premium develops gradually in time and is not 
characteristic among highly qualified employees in managing position, 
sharing some of the campany’s rent with the employees can be presumed as 
the reason of wage premium. In the background of rent-sharing there may be 
the employees’ bargaining position and the company’s readiness to reduce 
losses deriving from workplace disputes, so our recognition is consistent with 
Pugel’s [1980] conclusions and with the implications of Carmichael’s [1992] 
model.  
 We identify direct welfare gain from FDI realized by production 
workers and nonmanagerial blue-collar employees. No possible negative 
effect can be found through the analysis of the wage premium (that captures 
the effect of FDI on the price of labour being one of the production factors 
associated with FDI). 
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